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Forthcoming Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law 
Abstract 
 When Roberta Karmel wrote the articles that are the subject of this symposium, she was 
skeptical of both the potential value of shareholder voting and the emerging involvement of 
institutional investors in corporate governance.  In the ensuing years, both the increased role 
and engagement of institutional investors and the heightened importance of shareholder voting 
offer new reasons to take Professor Karmel’s concerns seriously. Institutional investors have 
taken on a broader range of issues ranging from diversity and political spending to climate 
change and human capital management, and their ability to influence corporate policy on these 
issues has become more significant. 
 The broadened scope of institutional engagement and influence raises new questions 
about the legitimacy of institutional investor engagement.  Specifically, the mutual funds and 
other institutional investors are not principals but agents.   The exercise of institutional voting 
power is by fund managers or governance teams, people who have “little or no economic 
interest in the shares that they vote,” This “empty voting” has the potential to undermine the 
legitimacy of the shareholder franchise. It is of particular concern when the assets committed to 
a broad-based index fund are voted to support initiatives that have the potential to sacrifice 
economic value in favor of social or societal objectives about which the shareholders invested in 
that index fund may not agree. 
 Because of the risk that empty voting will not reflect the preferences of the true economic 
owners, this Article argues for change.  The Article identifies potential market-based solutions to 
increase the alignment between institutional engagement and the preferences of fund investors 
including greater and more transparent fund segmentation, pass-through voting, or an explicit 
mechanism for fund investors to communicate their preferences to asset managers.  At the same 
time, because asset managers have private incentives to retain their current power, the Article 
also considers potential regulatory reforms. 
I. Introduction 
Roberta Karmel’s scholarship demonstrates a skepticism of both shareholder voting and 
institutional investors.  She has warned that some shareholders can misuse the tools of 
shareholder democracy at the expense of their fellow shareholders and the corporation.1  She has 
 
* Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of Business Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  I am grateful to 
Elizabeth Pollman and to the participants in this symposium for helpful comments. It is an honor and pleasure to 
contribute this article to a symposium honoring Roberta Karmel.  Professor Karmel has been an inspiration, a 
mentor and a friend since I began teaching. 
1 Roberta Karmel, Voting Power Without Responsibility or Risk–How Should Proxy Reform Address the Decoupling 
of Economic and Voting Rights?, 55 VILL. L. REV. 93 (2010). 
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also worried that institutional investors may not act in the long-term interest of the corporations 
in which they are invested,2 and toward that end she has considered whether they should be 
constrained by fiduciary duties.3 
These concerns were important at the time Professor Karmel published these articles, ten 
to fifteen years ago, but the evolving role of large mutual fund sponsors in corporate governance 
offers new reasons to take them seriously.  Today, institutional investors own 70-80% of the 
stock in large publicly-traded companies in the United States.4  Of these investors, the “Big 
Three” mutual fund complexes alone – BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street5 – own over 20%, 
making their combined voting power influential and, in many cases, pivotal.6  Top managers at 
the large mutual fund complexes wield increasing influence over business operations.7  Indeed, 
the policies of the Big Three appear to have eclipsed the controversial influence of proxy advisor 
ISS.8   
Institutional engagement had traditionally been defended in terms of increasing officer 
and director accountability to shareholders with the objective of promoting firm economic 
value.9  As Professor Karmel recognized, institutional investors’ identification of so-called good 
governance practices led to wholesale governance reforms including the widespread elimination 
 
2 Roberta Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas–The Securities and Exchange Commission Takes 
Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. LAW. 79, 140 (2005) (“Many of the evils of the dot-coin bubble 
were caused by institutional investors and their portfolio managers, who first insisted that corporate officers have 
equity interests in their companies instead of relying upon cash compensation and who then pressured issuers to 
achieve higher earnings every quarter.”). 
3 Roberta Karmel, Should A Duty to the Corporation Be Imposed on Institutional Shareholders?, 60 BUS. LAW. 1 
(2004). 
4 Assaf Hamdani & Sharon Hannes, The Future of Shareholder Activism, 99 B.U. L. REV. 971, 973 (2019) 
(“institutional investors today collectively own 70-80% of the entire U.S. capital market”). 
5 See Jan Fichtner, Eelke M. Heemskerk & Javier Garcia-Bernardo, Hidden Power of the Big Three? Passive Index 
Funds, Re-Concentration of Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 BUS. & POL. 298, 304 (2017) 
(terming BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street the “Big Three” due to their domination of the asset management 
industry).  
6 Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99 B.U. L. REV. 721, 724 (2019) (“Following two 
decades of growth, the Big Three now collectively hold an average stake of more than 20% of S&P 500 
companies.”). 
7 Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Power of the Big Three and Why it Matters, (Harv. L. Sch. & B.U. Sch. L., 
Working Paper, dated 2/21/2021), 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/The_Power_of_the_Big_Three_and_Why_It_Matters.pdf (“the Big 
Three have considerable power and influence on corporate decisions and outcomes”); Niccolo Calvi, Toward 
Shareholder Vote on Equity Issuances, 10 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 19 (2021) (“Recent studies describe the business 
model of the institutional investors and point out how the size of the stake they usually hold results in an interest in 
not missing the opportunity to cast their determinative vote in an informed way in order to beneficially impact the 
firm's performance.”). 
8 Audra Boone, Stuart L. Gillan, & Mitch Towner, The Role of Proxy Advisors and Large Passive Funds in 
Shareholder Voting: Lions or Lambs?, in 2ND ANNUAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, REGULATION AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE CONFERENCE, at 4 (February 20, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2831550 (“our results suggest that 
the Big 3 have become more influential in voting outcomes, and ISS less so, in the post-crisis period”) 
9 Giovanni Strampelli, Knocking at the Boardroom Door: A Transatlantic Overview of Director-Institutional 
Investor Engagement in Law and Practice, 12 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 187, 190 (2018) (“institutional shareholders are 
expected to hold managers more accountable for company valuation and urge them to favor a long-term approach 
when making business decisions”). 
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of staggered boards of directors in established companies, dramatic reforms to the structure of 
executive compensation, the adoption of proxy access and majority voting, and greater 
shareholder power to call special meetings.10  Commentators have criticized some of these 
efforts in retrospect as based on mixed empirical evidence and having, in some cases, unintended 
and potentially detrimental effects on firm value.11 
  In recent years, however, the focus on institutional investor stewardship has changed.  
Institutional investors have taken on a broader range of issues ranging from diversity and 
political spending to climate change and human capital management.  In most cases, investors 
defend their engagement on these issues as enhancing firm-specific economic value.12  They 
have increasingly faced calls to do more, however, and to promote the needs of their broader 
portfolio, the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders, and the interests of society as a whole.13  
This broadened scope of institutional engagement and influence raises new questions 
about the legitimacy of institutional investor engagement.  Specifically, the mutual funds and 
other institutions engaged in this stewardship are not principals but agents.  The economic 
interest underlying their voting power is held by millions of mutual fund beneficiaries who do 
not play any role in deciding how the mutual funds they own will vote their shares and who may 
or may not support their initiatives.14  The exercise of voting power by fund managers or 
governance teams, people who have “little or no economic interest in the shares that they vote,” 
is how Professor Karmel described empty voting in her 2010 Villanova Law Review article.15  
As Professor Karmel explained, “[e]mpty voting seriously undermines the shareholder 
franchise.”16    
Concededly, the empty voting problem about which Professor Karmel wrote, a problem 
typified by hedge funds whose economic interests were directly opposed to the voting power 
they exercised, is quite different from the case of a mutual fund voting the shares of its portfolio 
 
10 See Karmel, supra note 1, at 106–108 (recounting these developments).  
11 See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, The Promise and Perils of Corporate Governance 
Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1814 (2008) (“Despite widespread belief in the importance of governance 
mechanisms for resolving agency problems, the empirical literature investigating the effect of individual corporate 
governance mechanisms on corporate performance has not been able to identify systematically positive effects and 
is, at best, inconclusive.”). 
12 See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Opt-In Stewardship: Toward an Optimal Delegation of Mutual Fund Voting Authority, 
98 TEX. L. REV. 983, 1030 (2020) (reporting that the large asset managers claim that their engagement on ESG 
issues focuses on wealth maximization). 
13 See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systematic Stewardship, (COLUM. L. SCH., Working Paper, dated February 14, 2021) 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3782814 (arguing institutional investors should engage on the basis of portfolio-wide 
impacts); Madison Condon, Externalities and the Common Owner, 95 WASH. L. REV. 1, 81 (2020) (arguing that 
institutional investors should “function as ‘surrogate regulators,’ sacrificing individual firm profits for the benefit of 
the broader portfolio”). 
14 See, e.g., Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Who Calls the Shots? How Mutual Funds Vote on Director 
Elections, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 35, 37–38 (2013) (“mutual funds are merely intermediaries—holders of pooled 
investments—and the funds’ investors, those with an economic interest in the underlying securities, lack voting 
authority”); Griffith, supra note 12, at 992 (“most mutual fund investors receive the economic returns of portfolio 
company shares but no right to vote their proportional interest in them”).  
15 Karmel, supra note 1, at 93.  
16 Id. at 94.  
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companies.17  The mutual fund is a legitimate record holder of the shares.  In a substantial 
majority of cases, its interests are aligned both with the interests of its customers—the holders of 
mutual fund shares—and the interests of other shareholders in the portfolio companies.  In 
addition, the managers of mutual funds are constrained by the fiduciary duties they owe to their 
beneficiaries, duties that they take very seriously.  But Professor Karmel’s article provides an 
interesting lens through which to examine current institutional investor engagement efforts, and 
the analogy highlights some of the issues about which we might be concerned. 
Specifically, the analogy to empty voting highlights the fact that, as agents, the 
preferences of those who vote mutual fund shares may, in some cases, differ from the interests of 
mutual fund shareholders.  The potential for such differences increases when the scope of voting 
issues expands from director elections and issues involving corporate structure and governance 
to politically divisive issues such as diversity, wealth inequality, and climate change. Although 
investors may share a common interest in the survival of the planet or moving toward a more just 
world, there is no particular reason to think that people who commit their assets to a broad-based 
diversified index fund, often through an employer-sponsored 401(k) plan, share the political or 
social views of fund managers.  Nor is there reason to believe that they intend, through the 
delegation to those managers of investment authority, to give fund managers the authority to 
pursue social welfare objectives, objectives that traditionally have been pursued through the 
political process.18   
The challenge increases for initiatives that potentially involve sacrificing shareholder 
economic value in the name of non-shareholder interests, such as recent shareholder proposals 
seeking to have traditional corporations convert to public benefit corporations.19  Unlike the 
empty voting by hedge funds that Professor Karmel wrote about, the empty voting resulting from 
intermediation creates the risk that the voting decisions of a small number of institutional fund 
managers will dictate the outcome of a substantial number of shareholder votes, dominating the 
interests of other investor groups who, unlike the fund managers, have real skin in the game.   
Because of the increasing risk that this empty voting will not reflect the preferences of 
the true economic owners, and because of the potential for the private interests of fund managers 
and sponsors to drive fund voting decisions, this Article argues for change.  Change can come 
from within, and this Article identifies potential market-based solutions to increase the alignment 
between institutional engagement and the preferences of fund investors. These solutions include 
 
17 I am not the first to describe mutual funds as engaging in empty voting.  See Bernard S. Sharfman, Mutual Fund 
Advisors’ “Empty Voting” Raises New Governance Issues, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (July 3, 2017), 
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/07/03/mutual-fund-advisors-empty-voting-raises-new-governance-issues/ 
(describing and criticizing “the ‘empty voting’ of mutual fund advisors”). 
18 The line, of course, is not self-evident. A variety of issues with political and social dimensions directly impact a 
corporation’s economic value, a point that many commentators make in supporting increased disclosure of ESG 
issues in financial reporting.  See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107 GEO. L.J. 
923, 933 (2019) (citing literature identifying a relationship between sustainability and operating performance). 
19 See, e.g., Memorandum from Jennifer H. Noonan to the Chief Counsel at the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Exhibit A (Nov. 20, 2020) (on file with the SEC), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-
noaction/14a-8/2020/mcritchietractor123120-14a8-incoming.pdf (requesting the Board of Tractor Supply Company 
to take the necessary steps to cause the company to become a Public Benefit Corporation). 
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greater and more transparent fund segmentation, pass-through voting, or an explicit mechanism 
for fund investors to communicate their preferences to asset managers.  As the Article warns, 
however, market-based solutions require the cooperation of asset managers, who have private 
incentives to retain their current power.  Accordingly, the Article also considers potential 
regulatory reforms.  
 This Article begins by reviewing how institutional investor engagement has evolved in 
scale, scope, and influence.  It then explains the analogy between the structure of institutional 
engagement and Professor Karmel’s concern about empty voting.  Finally, the Article considers 
regulatory and market-based approaches that might increase the alignment between the exercise 
of institutional voting rights and the economic interests that underly those rights.  Ultimately, this 
alignment is necessary to retain the legitimacy of the shareholder franchise. 
II. The Evolution of Mutual Fund Engagement 
 Both the degree to which institutional investors dominate the ownership of publicly-
traded securities and the concentration of that ownership have increased over time. Institutional 
ownership of publicly-traded U.S. equity increased from around 6% in 1950 to more than 50% 
by 2001.20  Subsequently, that percentage has grown to approximately 80%.21  Significantly, the 
largest institutional investors have grown larger and, as a result, a small number of investors, in 
some cases as few as three, own a substantial block in the largest publicly-traded companies.22  
These blocks give the largest institutional investors considerable power over the activities of 
their portfolio companies. 
 Although historically institutional investors were relatively passive, they have become 
increasingly engaged.  This engagement responds to both regulatory and academic demands that 
institutional investors engage more extensively with their portfolio companies.23  In 2003, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) adopted rules requiring mutual fund companies to 
vote and to disclose their voting positions.24  After a relatively slow start in which mutual funds 
relied heavily on proxy advisor recommendations,25 they began to act more independently – to 
 
20 Matteo Tonello & Stephan Rabimov, The 2010 Institutional Investment Report: Trends in Asset Allocation and 
Portfolio Composition 22 (Megan Manni ed., 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1707512. 
21 80% of equity market cap held by institutions, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Apr. 25, 2017, 
https://www.pionline.com/article/20170425/INTERACTIVE/170429926/80-of-equity-market-cap-held-by-
institutions. 
22 Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 6.  
23 Alan R. Palmiter, Mutual Fund Voting of Portfolio Shares: Why Not Disclose?, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1419, 1439–
1440 (2002) (noting that many observers “doubt whether the mutual fund industry is taking seriously its voting 
function”). 
24 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2(c)(2) (2003).  The rule followed a release by the Department of Labor stating that pension 
funds were required by their fiduciary duties to vote the shares of their portfolio companies.  Interpretive Bulletins 
Relating to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2 (2002) (fiduciary act of 
managing employee benefit plan assets consisting of equity securities includes voting of those securities). 
25 James Cotter, Alan Palmiter, & Randall Thomas, ISS Recommendations and Mutual Fund Voting on Proxy 
Proposals, 55 VILL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010) (finding that during from 2003-2008 “mutual funds tend to vote in line with 
ISS recommendations across the board”).   
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analyze, to vote, and to engage.26  The Big Three now have dedicated governance teams to 
analyze proxy voting decisions and to engage directly with their portfolio companies.27   
 Institutional investors initially focused their engagement on governance.  Led by several 
large pension funds that not only exercised voting power but began to sponsor governance 
shareholder proposals,28 institutional investors voted their stock in favor of shareholder proposals 
to reform corporate governance such as proposals seeking independent boards, the elimination of 
poison pills and staggered boards of directors, and the adoption of performance-based 
compensation.29  These efforts were effective.  The Harvard Shareholder Rights Project 
partnered with institutional investors to bring shareholder proposals asking issuers to eliminate 
their staggered boards and reported that, over a three-year period, 121 companies agreed to move 
to annual elections.30  With the congressional adoption of an advisory vote on executive 
compensation—say on pay—as part of the Dodd-Frank Act, institutions became engaged in 
broader reforms to the size and structure of executive pay.31  Institutional investors were pivotal 
in persuading issuers to adopt reforms such as majority voting32 and proxy access.33  Although 
non-hedge fund institutions focused largely on governance proposals that could be applied across 
the range of their portfolio companies, they also played an increasingly important role in 
evaluating firm-specific activism and lending their voting support to activist campaigns that they 
viewed as appropriate.34 
 In contrast, large institutional investors initially limited their engagement with respect to 
Environmental, Social, and Governance (“ESG”) issues.35  That orientation has shifted, and 
 
26 See Jill Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The New Titans of Wall Street: A Theoretical 
Framework for Passive Investors, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 17 (2019). 
27 Id. at 49.  
28 Diane Del Guercio & Jennifer Hawkins, The Motivation and Impact of Pension Fund Activism, 52 J. FIN. ECON. 
293, 297 (1999) (noting that CalPERS, CalSTRS, NYC, SWIB, and CREF sponsored 18% of all corporate 
governance proposals submitted in 1987–1993). 
29 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang, Staggered Boards and the Wealth of 
Shareholders: Evidence from a Natural Experiment 3 (Harv. Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., and Bus., 
Discussion Paper No. 697, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1706806 (describing increasing institutional investor 
efforts to eliminate staggered boards); Soren Lindstrom, Shareholder Activism Against Poison Pills: An Effective 
Antidote?, 9 WALL ST. LAWYER 17, 17 (2015) (“Today shareholders increasingly are exercising their right to vote 
for proposals to eliminate shareholder rights plans . . . .”).  
30 121 Companies Agreed to Move towards Annual Election, HARVARD SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROJECTS, 
http://www.srp.law.harvard.edu/companies-entering-into-agreements.shtml (last visited Aug. 20, 2021). 
31 See Jill Fisch, Darius Palia & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Is Say on Pay All About Pay? The Impact of Firm 
Performance, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 101, 101 (2018). (empirically analyzing say on pay votes). 
32 Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch, Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Does Majority Voting Improve Board 
Accountability?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1119, 1127 (2016) (describing issuer shift from plurality to majority voting); 
33 See, e.g., Holly Gregory, The Latest on Proxy Access, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV., (Feb. 1, 2019), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/01/the-latest-on-proxy-access/ (noting the “the widespread adoption of 
proxy access by large U.S. public companies” in response to “[p]ressure from large institutional investors, including 
public and private pension funds”).  
34 See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the 
Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 865–67 (2013). 
35 See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? the Erosion of the Anglo-American 
Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493, 546 (2005) (“U.S. mutual funds show little evidence of 
serious consideration of social and environmental issues.”); see also Press Release, IRRC, Most Mutual Funds 
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institutions have become increasingly engaged in ESG issues.36  The Investor Responsibility 
Research Center (“IRRC”) reported in 2011 that approximately 50% of institutional investors 
reported engaging on environmental and social issues.37  Votes by BlackRock and Vanguard at 
Occidental and ExxonMobil in 2017 were critical to the first climate-change shareholder 
proposals receiving majority support.38  Larry Fink’s 2021 letter to shareholders boasted of 
BlackRock’s increasing dedication to ESG issues.39 In BlackRock’s quarterly stewardship report 
for Q1 2021, it reported that it supported 75% of environmental and social shareholder 
proposals.40 In May 2021, environmental activist Engine No. 1 was successful in winning board 
representation at Exxon for directors who ran on a platform of addressing climate change, due in 
part to the support of large institutional investors such as BlackRock.41 
 There are several reasons for this shift.  Commentators have noted the attraction of ESG 
as an investment trend, and asset managers may seek ESG engagement as a form of branding42 
or to attract investments, particularly from socially-conscious millennial investors.43  Portraying 
themselves as socially responsible may assist asset managers in forestalling regulation and may 
temper initiatives to reduce their power.44 U.S. asset managers may be influenced by efforts in 
 
Opposed All Social Proposals (Sept. 15, 2004), http://www.irrc.com/company/Mutual Funds 0904.html (reporting 
that a “majority of the nation’s 100 largest mutual funds opposed all social issue shareholder resolutions that came 
to votes in the first half of 2004. . .”). 
36  Robert G. Eccles & Svetlana Klimenko, The Investor Revolution, HARV. BUS. REV. (May-June 2019) 
https://hbr.org/2019/05/the-investor-revolution (“Over the past five years or so, investors have become increasingly 
interested in ESG issues.”); David Hess, Public Pensions and the Promise of Shareholder Activism for the Next 
Frontier of Corporate Governance: Sustainable Economic Development, 2 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 221, 223 (2007) 
(“[F]or many investors, governance issues are transforming into ‘environmental, social, and governance’ (‘ESG’) 
issues.”). 
37 Jon Lukomnik & Marc Goldstein, The State of Engagement Between U.S. Corporations and Shareholders, HARV. 
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV. (Mar. 15, 2011), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/03/15/the-state-of-engagement-
between-u-s-corporations-and-shareholders/. 
38 Cydney S. Posner, Are Shareholder Proposals on Climate Change Becoming a Thing?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 21, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/06/21/are-shareholder-proposals-on-
climate-change-becoming-a-thing/. 
39 Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s Chairman’s Letter, BLACKROCK, 2021, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-
relations/larry-fink-chairmans-letter (stating that “we are increasingly using our voice and our insights to advocate 
on behalf of clients for more sustainable and inclusive economies”). 
40 BlackRock Investment Stewardship, Q1 2021 Global Quarterly Stewardship Report at 3 (May 2021), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-qrtly-stewardship-report-q1-2021.pdf. 
41 Kevin Crowley & Scott Deveau, Exxon CEO is Dealt Stinging Setback at Hands of New Activist, BLOOMBERG 
GREEN (May 26, 2021, 1:18 PM), https://bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-05-26/tiny-exxon-investor-notches-
climate-win-with-two-board-seats. 
42 State Street, for example, has developed a brand associated with an emphasis on diversity through its “Fearless 
Girl” campaign.  See Fearless Girl Campaign Positive Change Continues, STATE ST. GLOB. ADVISORS (Mar. 19, 
2021), https://www.ssga.com/us/en/individual/mf/insights/asr-fearless-girl-campaign. 
43 Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis & David H. Webber, Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG Activism and the 
New Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 1243, 1251, 1294 (2020) (“In response to competition 
for money to manage, the largest pools of assets in our economy have turned their power as shareholders to 
advancing investors' social agenda.”). 




the EU and UK to require institutional investors to engage in responsible stewardship.45  And 
socially or politically responsible investing behavior may be consistent with the personal 
preferences of fund managers, who view their actions as in the best interests of society. 
 Significantly, the potential voting power exercised by institutional investors enables them 
to influence corporate policy without the need to utilize a formal shareholder vote.46  
Increasingly issuers facing the prospect of large institutional support for shareholder proposals 
often do not even put those proposals to a vote, but voluntarily agree to the proponent’s demands 
in exchange for withdrawal of the proposal. This settlement mechanism has the effect of 
influencing operational change without the transparency of a proxy statement and voting 
outcome.47  And increasingly, these agreed-upon changes encompass ESG issues. For example, 
the board of Yum brands voluntarily agreed, in response to a shareholder proposal, to provide a 
report on the effects of antibiotic use in its supply chain.48 
 The objectives of institutional shareholder engagement and influence continue to expand. 
The issue of racial justice is one example, and a substantial number of companies have 
announced donations, policy changes and other reform initiatives.49  Racial justice is also a topic 
of increasing concern for institutional investors.50   Shareholders are introducing and supporting 
proposals seeking increased diversity reporting, and racial equity audits.51  Several shareholder 
groups are pushing institutional investors to do more to hold companies accountable – criticizing 
investors for supporting management’s nominees at companies with insufficient board 
 
45 See generally Dionysia Katelouzou & Mathias Siems, The Global Diffusion of Stewardship Codes, in GLOBAL 
SHAREHOLDER STEWARDSHIP: COMPLEXITIES, CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES (Dionysia Katelouzou & Dan W. 
Puchniak eds., forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3616798 (detailing the use 
of stewardship codes across a wide range of jurisdictions). 
46 See Sarah C. Haan, Shareholder Proposal Settlements and the Private Ordering of Public Elections, 126 YALE 
L.J. 262, 273, 312 (2016). 
47 At least one such settlement has generated legal challenge. In January 2021, a pension fund filed suit alleging that 
Twitter’s agreement to add three new board members in response to a threatened proxy contest by hedge fund Elliot 
Management violated the Twitter board’s fiduciary duties.  Sujeet Indap, Mystique of Elliott Management at issue in 
challenge from Twitter shareholder, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/5f3dd95f-8a7c-4f39-
991a-87b2bc05691c. 
48 The Shareholder Commons Announces Withdrawal of Shareholder Proposal after Yum! Brands Commits to 
Disclose Systemic Costs of Antibiotic Use, PRNEWSWIRE (Mar. 3, 2021, 12:56 ET), 
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/the-shareholder-commons-announces-withdrawal-of-shareholder-
proposal-after-yum-brands-commits-to-disclose-systemic-costs-of-antibiotic-use-301239878.html 
49 See, e.g., Gillian Friedman, Here’s What Companies are Promising to do to Fight Racism, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/companies-racism-george-floyd-protests.html (describing some of the 
pledges, donations and changes made by companies to address racial justice since the killing of George Floyd).  
50 Julie Wokaty, Investors Commit to Address Systemic Racism Through Corporate Engagements and Policy 
Advocacy, INTERFAITH CTR. ON CORP. RESP.: JULIE WOKATY’S BLOG (June 18, 2020), 
https://www.iccr.org/investors-commit-address-systemic-racism-through-their-portfolios-corporate-engagements-
and-policy (describing the Racial Justice Investing Coalition as “a group of investors who have used their collective 
leverage as fiduciaries and shareholders to advance racial justice issues since December of 2017”). 
51 See, e.g., Lorraine Woellert, Catherine Boudreau & Kellie Mejdrich, Shareholders Target ‘White Man’s World’ 
with Record Demands for Diversity Data, POLITICO (Apr. 6, 2021, 12:01 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/news/2021/04/06/shareholders-diversity-data-479159 (reporting shareholder proposals 
seeking data on diversity in corporate boards and workforces); Heidi Walsh & Michael Passoff, PROXY PREVIEW 




diversity.52 Similarly, institutions have been called upon to exert pressure against companies 
located in states that sought to restrict voting rights after the 2020 presidential election.53    
 The extent to which ESG, social and political issues should be addressed through 
corporate policies and the further degree to which those policies should be informed by 
shareholder engagement is a complex question beyond the scope of this Article.  The foregoing 
discussion simply highlights the expansive range of topics that are now the subject of such 
engagement.  That expansive range of topics, however, complicates the practice of institutional 
investor voting because, as noted above, an institution’s voting policies are not determined by its 
customers or beneficiaries—those with skin in the game—but are instead determined by advisors 
who are managing other people’s money.  This Article argues that, as the scope of shareholder 
voting extends beyond purely economic issues to encompass a broader range of societal interests 
and concerns, the potential concerns over this empty voting, to which the Article now turns, 
increase. 
III. Mutual Funds and Empty Voting 
 
A. The Empty Voting Debate 
 In 2004, Perry Capital, a hedge fund, acquired a substantial block of shares of Mylan 
Pharmaceuticals for the purpose of voting that stock against a proposed merger with King 
Pharmaceutical, a company in which Perry owned 7 million shares.54 It turned out that Perry had 
fully hedged its interest in Mylan, enabling it to vote its Mylan shares in favor of a merger in 
which Mylan was overpaying for King, without suffering the economic effects of that 
overpayment.55  Several commentators seized upon the Mylan/King merger and other similar 
examples to describe a phenomenon they termed “empty voting.”56  Empty voting is voting 
shares in which the person exercising voting power lacks an economic interest in the shares 
being voted.57   
Empty voting is a specific example of a broader phenomenon that has been termed 
morphable voting, in which investors use a range of structures to decouple the voting rights of 
stock from the related economic interest in that stock.58 In Black and Hu’s article, they 
demonstrated several different scenarios under which a shareholder could obtain voting rights 
 
52 Leslie P. Norton, Activists Pressure Corporate Boards to Address Racial Justice, Voting Laws, BARRON’S (Apr. 
20, 2021, 3:46 PM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/activists-pressure-corporate-boards-to-address-racial-justice-
voting-laws-51618947999. 
53 Id.   
54 Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 
S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 816 (2006). 
55 Id.  
56 See, e.g., Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775; Hu & Black, supra note 
54, at 816–817; Patricia Beck, Note, What we talk about when we talk about Voting: Efficiency and the Error in 
Empty voting, 21 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 211 (2016). 
57 Cf. Hu & Black, supra note 54, at 825 (defining “empty voters” as “any persons whose voting rights substantially 
exceed their net economic ownership.”). 
58 See id. at 826. (using the term morphable voting).  
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without the economic risks of share ownership.59  They criticized this process as problematic 
because the legitimacy of the shareholder voting process is premised on the expectation that 
shareholders will vote in accordance with their economic interests and therefore in accordance 
with what they believe to be the best interests of the company.60   
 Sean Martin and Frank Partnoy similarly observed that the separation of voting rights 
from underlying the economic interest is widespread because it occurs through stock lending and 
shorting transactions that are commonplace in the market.61  Martin and Partnoy argued that the 
increasing prevalence of encumbered shares—“shares held by stockholders who lack the 
otherwise homogeneous incentives generated by ‘pure’ share ownership”62—limited the 
potential efficiency associated with a one share/one vote rule.63 Jordan Barry, John William 
Hatfield, and Scott Duke Kominers further demonstrated through formal models that investor use 
of derivatives to engage in empty voting could “render financial markets unpredictable, unstable, 
and inefficient.”64  
 Professor Karmel’s 2009 article considered the potential connection of empty voting to 
another issue on the SEC’s regulatory agenda – proxy access.65  In 2009, the SEC proposed a 
proxy access rule to permit shareholders to nominate director candidates who would be included 
in an issuer’s proxy statement.66  For Professor Karmel, who was skeptical about increasing the 
power of institutional investors,67 empty voting heightened the problem by increasing the power 
of some shareholders whose interests were not necessarily aligned with those of other 
shareholders and the corporation.  In particular, Professor Karmel worried that proxy access 
could allow activist investors, such as hedge funds, to challenge incumbent boards in order to 
further their interests not as shareholders but as traders.68 
Concerns about empty voting led commentators to advocate reform – arguing that either 
state legislatures, the SEC, or corporations themselves through private ordering should limit the 
 
59 Hu & Black, supra note 54. 
60 Id. at 820.  
61 Martin & Partnoy, supra note 56.  
62 Id. at 780.  
63 Id. at 813.  
64 Jordan M. Barry, John William Hatfield, & Scott Duke Kominers, On Derivatives Markets and Social Welfare: A 
Theory of Empty Voting and Hidden Ownership, 99 VA. L. REV. 1103, 1110 (2013) (observing that opaque 
derivatives markets have this impact). 
65 Karmel, supra note 1.  
66 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024 (June 18, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 200, 232, 240, 249, and 274).  The SEC promulgated the proposal after Congress authorized the SEC to adopt a 
proxy access rule as part of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2008. The SEC subsequently adopted a proxy access rule, Rule 
14a-11, but the DC Circuit subsequently invalidated the rule.  See Jill E. Fisch, The Destructive Ambiguity of 
Federal Proxy Access, 61 EMORY L.J. 435, 447–448 (2012) (describing the history of the SEC’s proxy access rule). 
67 See, e.g., Karmel, supra note 1, at 123 (observing that proxy contests are “not generally in a corporation’s best 
long-term interests.”). 
68 Id. (“Because the shareholder franchise is an important accountability mechanism, it should be protected from 
exploitation by large shareholders whose interests and loyalties are not necessarily aligned with other shareholders 
(especially retail shareholders), or the corporation, just as the shareholder franchise is protected from exploitation by 
incumbent managers and directors.”).  
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capacity of decoupled shareholders to vote.69 On July 14, 2010, the SEC issued a concept release 
requesting comments on a variety of issues in connection with the proxy voting system, 70  
including empty voting, but the release did not result in new regulations. Situations involving 
empty voting continue to arise, particularly in connection with share lending programs in which 
an investor that borrows shares has the right to vote those shares unless they are recalled by the 
lending institution.71 The potential inefficiency that can arise when shareholders do not exercise 
voting rights that are proportional to their economic interest extends to other situations such as 
dual class voting structures.72   
B. Empty Voting Revisited   
 The traditional concern over empty voting stemmed from a conflict between the 
economic interests of activist hedge funds and other shareholders of the portfolio company 
whose shares they were voting.73 Voting by institutional investors who hold stock as 
intermediaries is different.  In particular, the amount of stock owned by mutual funds is 
transparent, unlike the ownership stakes of hedge funds, which need not be disclosed unless the 
hedge fund owns over 5% of a portfolio company’s voting securities.74 In addition, mutual funds 
must publicly disclose how they vote their stock; hedge funds need not do so.75 
 Yet the analogy to empty voting by hedge funds is similar.  Mutual fund managers (and 
fund governance teams) do not own the stock they are voting.  More significantly, although the 
mutual fund is technically the owner of the shares, it is the fund’s shareholders that hold the 
fund’s economic value.  Although fund shareholders are the ones whose economic interests are 
affected by voting outcomes, they have no role in deciding how those votes are cast.  Indeed, in 
many cases, fund shareholders may be unaware of the fund’s voting records or policies.76 
Although mutual funds are required to disclose this information, it may be difficult and costly for 
investors to find it.77 
 
69 See, e.g., Beck, supra note 56, at 224 (arguing for SEC action or amendments to corporate bylaws).  
70 Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System, Exchange Act Release No. 62,495, Investment Company Act Release 
No. 29,340, 75 Fed. Reg. 42,982 (July 22, 2010). 
71 Kate Burgess, Market reverberates with accusations of ‘empty voting’, FIN. TIMES, (July 15, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/0e28929e-85dd-11e8-a29d-73e3d454535d. 
72 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Perils of Small-Minority Controllers, 107 GEO. L. J. 1453, 1459 
(2019) (identifying inefficiency when corporate controllers can exercise substantially greater voting power than their 
economic interest). 
73 See Hu & Black supra note 54, at 816–817.  
74 See Barry, Hartfield & Kominers, supra note 64, at 1115 (modeling the problematic impact of empty voting that is 
not transparent).  
75 See Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment 
Companies, Release No. IC-25922 (Jan. 31, 2003) (adopting the requirement that mutual funds disclose their votes 
on form N-PX). 
76 See Acting Chair Allison Herren Lee, Every Vote Counts: The Importance of Fund Voting and Disclosure (Mar. 
17, 2021) (https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/lee-every-vote-counts) (“It’s hard to see how retail investors can 
formulate an accurate and reliable picture of how a fund votes on ESG issues when they are forced to parse 
voluminous forms that often use bespoke shorthand for shareholder proposals.”). 
77 See, e.g., id. (observing that funds’ disclosures on form N-PX “are unwieldy, difficult to understand, and difficult 
to compare across fund complexes”).   
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Commentators have focused limited attention on empty voting by mutual fund advisors, 
presumably because, until relatively recently, there were few reasons to suspect that such voting 
deviated substantially from the interests of fund beneficiaries.  To be sure, commentators argued 
that funds were overly deferential to management, and some suggested that this deference was 
due to advisor-level conflicts of interest such as a desire to obtain outside business.78   There was 
little evidence however, that mutual fund shareholders wanted their funds to be more active.79  In 
any event, other investors, including public pension funds, hedge funds and retail investors, 
increasingly challenged management through the proxy voting process.  Over time, mutual funds 
have increasingly supported those initiatives.80  
As institutional investors began to engage more actively and to vote their shares more 
critically of management, they focused on issues that appeared to be related to the issuer’s 
economic value. Hedge fund challenges, for example, involved proposed structural or 
operational challenges that were billed as increasing or unlocking firm value.81 Institutions 
challenged executive compensation, defending their votes as an effort to reduce managerial 
agency costs.82 In this context, any potential agency problem between the mutual fund advisor 
and its beneficiaries did not appear significant – engagement that promoted firm economic value 
automatically redounded to the benefit of the fund’s beneficiaries. 
It is worth noting that, as mutual funds have increased their engagement, they have 
focused largely on governance reforms such as proxy access, annual election of directors and 
majority voting, say on pay – all reforms that increase shareholder empowerment.  As Bernie 
Sharfman has noted, the shareholders that were empowered by these reforms, which issuers 
broadly adopted in response to institutional pressure, were not retail investors, but these same 
institutions.83  Institutions could then wield their power over board composition and executive 
pay to pressure corporate managers to adopt the policies favored by those institutions.  Fund 
managers could use their voting power to discipline Fortune 500 CEOs who did not take their 
calls and pay attention to their letters.  The result was to give large asset management firms a 
 
78 See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney & Julia D. Mahoney, The New Separation of Ownership and Control: Institutional 
Investors and ESG, 2021 COLUM. BUS L. REV. (forthcoming Aug. 2021) (manuscript at 14) 
(https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3809914) (“critics observe that fund managers may choose to 
vote with corporate management so as not to damage other business relationships with the company”); Sean J. 
Griffith & Dorothy S. Lund, Conflicted Mutual Fund Voting in Corporate Law, 99 B.U.L. REV. 1151, 1157 (2019) 
(terming this type of conflict “Corporate Client Conflict”). 
79 Indeed, it is not clear that retail fund investors even have opinions on how their shares should be voted. That retail 
shareholders might be rationally apathetic or prefer to delegate these decisions to expert fund managers is one 
rationale for preferring some system by which investors can communicate their voting preferences, if they have any, 
rather than providing them with the opportunity to vote their shares directly.  See infra Part IV. 
80 Lisa M. Fairfax, From Apathy to Activism: The Emergence, Impact, and Future of Shareholder Activism as the 
New Corporate Governance Norm, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1301, 1305 (2019) (describing the shift from apathy to activism 
as “a radical departure from the traditional corporate governance norm”). 
81 See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 34.  
82 See, e.g., Jay C. Hartzell & Laura T. Starks, Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation, 58 J. FIN. 2351, 
2352 (2003).  
83 See Sharfman, supra note 17 (distinguishing between shareholder empowerment objective, which is beneficial to 
asset managers, and wealth maximization for fund shareholders).  
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voice in setting corporate policy.84  It also created the potential for misuse, such as the concern 
that institutions would encourage their portfolio companies to engage in anticompetitive 
behavior.85  Jeff Schwartz has identified an alternative selfish motivation, arguing that mutual 
funds engage in stewardship in “an attempt to mollify the public and regulators” and to forestall 
efforts to limit their power or ownership concentration.86  
The increased focus of institutional investor stewardship on ESG initiatives is different 
both because the connection of these initiatives to firm-specific economic value is unclear and 
because ESG issues raise a greater potential for asset managers to act for nonfinancial reasons, 
such as pursuing a favored social or political objective.   Concededly, most institutional investors 
argue that their goal in pursuing board diversity or carbon neutrality is to increase the financial 
value of their funds.87  ESG covers a broad range of issues, however, and, to date, the evidence 
linking those issues to economic value is mixed.88 Although a number of studies report that firms 
rated highly on ESG outperform their peers,89 there are a variety of empirical limitations to 
establishing a causal relationship with ESG and economic performance. Indeed, for a variety of 
reasons, the impact of an ESG initiative on a single firm’s economic value may be largely 
 
84 See Caleb N. Griffin, Estimating the Influence of the Big Three on Shareholder Proposals, 73 SMU L. REV. 409, 
415–16 (2020) (explaining that the stewardship teams of the Big Three can wield this influence by setting priorities, 
engaging with management and proxy voting). 
85 The literature regarding such potential anticompetitive behavior was sparked by two empirical papers: José Azar, 
Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership, 73 J. FIN. 1513, 1518 (2018) 
(analyzing the airline industry) and José Azar, Sahil Raina & Martin C. Schmalz, Ultimate Ownership and Bank 
Competition (May 4, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2710252 (analyzing the banking 
industry).  The subsequent academic debate over whether the claims are true and, if so, actionable violations of 
antitrust law, is extensive.  See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill & Marcel Kahan, The Strategies of Anticompetitive Common 
Ownership, 129 YALE L. J. 1392, 1410–1414 (2020) (discussing some of the academic literature).  
86 Schwartz, supra note 44.  
87 See, e.g., Letter from Cyrus Taraporevala, President & CEO, State St. Glob. Advisors, to Bd. Member, State St. 
Glob. Advisors (Jan. 28, 2020) (on file with https://www.ssga.com/us/en/institutional/ic/insights/informing-
betterdecisions-with-esg) (“We believe that addressing material ESG issues is good business practice and essential 
to a company’s long-term financial performance – a matter of value, not values.”) (emphasis omitted). 
88 See, e.g., Jesse M. Fried, Will Nasdaq's Diversity Rules Harm Investors? (Harv. Univ. and ECGI, Working Paper 
No. 579, 2021) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3812642 (arguing that “studies actually provide 
little support for the claim that gender or ethnic diversity in the boardroom increases shareholder value”); David 
Blitz & Laurens Swinkels, Does Excluding Sin Stocks Cost Performance? (June 25, 2021) 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3839065) (reporting evidence that excluding sin stocks can lead to underperformance); but 
see Richard W. Painter, Painter, Board Diversity: A Response to Professor Fried (April 11, 2021), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3824245) (challenging Fried’s analysis). 
89 See, e.g., Michael Katz, Increasing Body of Evidence Bolsters Case for ESG Investing, CHIEF INV. OFFICER (Sept. 
8, 2020), https://www.ai-cio.com/news/increasing-body-evidence-bolsters-case-esg-investing/ (reporting on study 
finding that “the companies that improved on material ESG issues ‘significantly outperformed’ their competitors”); 
Tensie Whelan, Ulrich Atz, Tracy Van Holt & Casey Clark, ESG and Financial Performance: Uncovering the 
Relationship by Aggregating Evidence from 1,000 Plus Studies Published between 2015 – 2020, ROCKEFELLER 
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (Feb. 10, 2021), https://www.stern.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/assets/documents/NYU-
RAM_ESG-Paper_2021%20Rev_0.pdf (reporting results from a meta-study of over 1000 research papers and 
finding a positive relationship between ESG and financial performance in 58% of the studies). 
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unknowable in that it depends on the subsequent behavior of the firm’s competitors, customers, 
and regulators.90 
Moreover, as Paul and Julia Mahoney observe, it is difficult, for a variety of reasons, to 
credit institutional investors’ claims that they are simply seeking to enhance firm economic 
value.91  Indeed, commentators defend institutional stewardship in support of broader objectives. 
Some commentators argue that mutual funds should engage in a manner that promotes the 
overall value of their portfolio even at the expense of the economic value of a specific firm, 
citing the portfolio effects of such engagement92 or the potential externalities of individual firm 
behavior.93  Others defend mutual fund stewardship explicitly addressed to stakeholder or 
societal interests, arguing that such efforts are necessary to address the failures of the political 
process to do so.94  
This broader focus raises a variety of challenges for mutual fund managers.  One is 
competency.  It is unclear that asset managers have the skill set to solve complex social 
problems.95 Promoting societal objectives involves judgment – by what year should Ford seek to 
become carbon neutral and, is carbon neutrality enough or should it attempt to become carbon 
negative?96  As SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce has explained, something that is good from the 
perspective of one ESG consideration might be bad from another.97  An initiative to promote 
 
90 See, e.g., Dorothy Lund, Corporate Finance for Social Good, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 1617, 1638 (2021) (describing 
potential secondary effects from a firm’s CSR activities).  
91 Among other things, Mahoney and Mahoney observe that an admission that institutions were sacrificing value for 
values would constitute a breach of fiduciary duty.  See Mahoney & Mahoney, supra note 78 (manuscript at 3). See 
also Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and 
Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 STAN. L. REV. REV. 381, 385–86 (2020) (arguing that fiduciaries can 
only consider ESG factors if: “(1) the trustee reasonably concludes that the ESG investment program will benefit the 
beneficiary directly by improving the risk-adjusted return; and (2) the trustee’s exclusive motive for adopting the 
ESG investment program is to obtain this direct benefit”).  
92 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 13.  
93 See THE SHAREHOLDER COMMONS INVITES SHAREHOLDERS TO SUBMIT PROPOSALS THAT MOVE BEYOND THE 
BUSINESS CASE, (2021) at 1, https://theshareholdercommons.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/TSC-2021-
Shareholder-Proposals-Strategy.pdf  (explaining the purpose of its shareholder proposal project as focusing on the 
external costs of corporate actions); see also id. at 7 (stating that “when companies ignore external costs, they 
increase profits but harm the economy”).  
94 See Lund, supra note 90, at 1632–33 (arguing that a private sector response is necessary because “optimal 
externality regulation is unlikely”).  
95 See, e.g., Davis Soderberg, Woke CEOs are undermining the democratic process, WASH. TIMES (July 27, 2021), 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2021/jul/27/woke-ceos-are-undermining-the-democratic-process/ 
(criticizing Larry Fink’s intention to force issuers to become carbon neutral by 2050 for failure to consider its costs 
and technical uncertainty); Anna Irrera, Jessica DiNapoli & Imani Moise, Take a stance or tiptoe away? Corporate 
America's battle with social activism, REUTERS (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-companies-
activism-analysis/take-a-stance-or-tiptoe-away-corporate-americas-battle-with-social-activism-idUSKBN27C1O3 
(identifying the challenges that these expectations impose on corporate issuers). 
96 See, e.g., Brad Smith, Microsoft will be carbon negative by 2030, OFFICIAL MICROSOFT BLOG (Jan. 16, 2020), 
https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2020/01/16/microsoft-will-be-carbon-negative-by-2030/ (announcing that, by 
2050, Microsoft will remove all the carbon from the environment that it has emitted since it was founded in 1975). 
97 Hester Peirce, Chocolate-Covered Cicadas Remarks Before the Brookings Institute (July 20, 2021), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/peirce-chocolate-covered-cicadas-
072021?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery (“people do not share uniform views of what good ESG 
practices are for issuers or good ESG portfolios are for asset managers”). 
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cleaner energy may sacrifice well-paying jobs.98  Similarly, a given technology may have both 
good and bad effects along the same dimension.99   
Increasingly, investor initiatives are seeking to have issuers reexamine profitable and 
legal business practices – gun sales, products that promote childhood obesity, and lending to 
carbon-intensive businesses.  In some cases, investors are demanding not merely that issuers 
reform their internal operations but that they engage in broader political and social debates.100 
Although institutional investors describe these efforts as an essential component of an issuer’s 
risk management and warn that companies face regulatory, political, and economic risk for 
ignoring ESG issues,101  companies may also face negative backlash and economic consequences 
for their ESG initiatives.102   
A second challenge is accountability.  Overcoming political failures through ESG 
initiatives undermines the regulatory decisions that have been made in accordance with the 
democratic process.103 Simply put, people have different views on what constitutes good ESG – 
both which societal goals a corporation should consider and the weight to be given to those 
goals.  As the recent presidential election demonstrated, the country is deeply divided on issues 
that include climate change, diversity, and voter rights,104 and shareholder engagement risks 
placing mutual funds in the role of unelected and unaccountable political actors.105 
 
98 See, e.g., Noam Scheiber, Building Solar Farms May Not Build the Middle Class, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/16/business/economy/green-energy-jobs-economy.html?searchResultPosition=1 
99 Peirce, supra note 97 (“a technology, for example, can have both positive and negative climate effects”). See also 
Benoit Faucon, Clean Energy Faces the Same Problem as Fossil Fuels: Community Protests, WALL ST. J. (July 12, 
2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/clean-energy-fossil-fuels-protests-11626094401 (citing environmentalist 
objections to renewable energy projects such as wind farms). 
100 See, e.g., Tammy Joyner, Investors wade into Georgia voting rights fray, ATLANTIC CIVIC CIRCLE (Mar. 23, 
2021), https://atlantaciviccircle.org/2021/03/23/heavyweight-investors-weigh-into-georgia-voting-rights-fray/ 
(describing efforts by nineteen investors to persuade business interests to take a stand against legislation to restrict 
voting rights in Georgia). 
101 See, e.g., Dylan Tokar, Will Political Polarization Stop Companies From Supporting Social Causes?, WALL ST. 
J. (Nov. 20, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/will-political-polarization-stop-companies-from-supporting-social-
causes-11605868200 (identifying the reputational risk companies face by failing to engage on social issues). 
102 For example, Unilever is facing backlash and potential regulatory consequences for the decision by its subsidiary 
Ben & Jerry’s to stop selling its product in Israeli-occupied territories. See Dov Lieber & Nick Kostov, Ben & 
Jerry’s Decision to Stop Sales in West Bank Puts Unilever in Tough Spot, WALL ST. J. (July 20, 2021), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/ben-jerrys-decision-to-stop-sales-in-west-bank-puts-unilever-in-tough-spot-
11626799596?mod=itp_wsj&mod=djemITP_h. See also Eugene Kontorovich, Ben & Jerry’s Israel Boycott Could 
Cost Unilever, WALL ST. J. (July 21, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ben-jerrys-boycott-unilever-israel-
palestine-11626895917?mod=itp_wsj&mod=djemITP_h (describing potential legal consequences to Unilever) 
103 See, e.g., Soderberg, supra note 95 (arguing that investor-driven ESG initiatives inappropriately bypass 
democratic lawmaking processes like passing legislation).  
104 See, e.g., Susan Milligan, A Place in the Political Sun, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 6, 2019), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2019-09-06/climate-change-is-a-big-2020-campaign-issue-but-
only-for-democrats. (“While polls show that more Americans believe climate change is a looming disaster, there is a 
deep ideological and political party divide, with an overwhelming majority of Democrats seeing a dangerous 
ecological and financial crisis but only a fraction of Republicans agreeing with them.”) 
105 See Esther Whieldon, Political divide over mandatory ESG disclosures on display at US House hearing, S&P 




 That asset managers lack public accountability for their social and political initiatives is 
problematic itself, but the critical feature is that they are supporting these initiatives with other 
people’s money.  As Caleb Griffin has observed, money managers make no effort to discern the 
preferences of their beneficiaries, and their voting patterns are “very unlikely” to match their 
beneficiaries’ preferences.106  Moreover, Paul Miller explains that pension and mutual fund 
managers are arguably forcing their customers to be associated with political or social positions 
that they may not support, particularly when those customers have invested through an 
employer-sponsored pension or 401(k) plan.107 It is not the goal of this Article to take a 
normative position on ESG issues in general or any particular ESG initiative.  When a small 
number of institutional investors have the power to decide the outcome of a substantial 
proportion of shareholder votes, however, that power should not be exercised through empty 
voting that need not reflect the preferences of those with skin in the game. 108  
 
IV. Aligning Engagement and Economic Interest 
 The potential for empty voting by institutional investors raises serious questions about the 
legitimacy of corporate voting outcomes, particularly voting outcomes on issues that involve a 
potential conflict between value and values or a possible conflict among competing ideological 
principles. The increasing frequency with which these issues are presented in shareholder 
proposals and their potential expansion to voting on director elections and bylaw amendments, as 
well as the meaningful impact that substantial voting support on these issues can have on 
operational decision making, highlights the importance of ensuring that voting outcomes reflect 
the preferences of those with skin in the game rather than the perspective of unaccountable 
intermediaries.  This Part offers several preliminary approaches to addressing the empty voting 
problem.  
A. Market-Based Responses 
One potential response to empty voting by institutional investors is private market 
mechanisms that would increase the alignment between fund engagement and the interests of 
fund investors.  Two general categories of market-based responses are possible.  The first is 
more transparent market segmentation that would enable fund investors to vote with their feet by 
 
62899325. (citing testimony from congressional panelist claiming that the ESG movement allows “rich investors 
and corporations to dictate what should be done on issues of morality and public policy.”). 
106 Caleb Griffin, Environmental & Social Voting at Index Funds, 44 DEL. J. CORP. L. 167, 211–212 (2021).  For 
further consideration of the extent to which institutional intermediaries vote in ways that differ from the preferences 
of retail investors see Alon Brav, Matthew D. Cain & Jonathon Zytnick, Retail Shareholder Participation in the 
Proxy Process: Monitoring, Engagement, and Voting (May 25, 2021) (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working 
Paper No. 637, 2019), at 5, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3387659. (documenting “substantial differences in voting 
between retail and institutional shareholders); see also Jill. E. Fisch, Standing Voting Instruction: Empowering the 
Excluded Retail Investor, 102 MINN. L. REV. 11, 15 (2017) (“there are reasons to believe that retail investor voting 
preferences differ systemically from those of institutional investors”). 
107 See Paul S. Miller, A Right For Retirement: Unconscionable Contracts, The Right (Not) to Associate, and 
Citizens United, 71 AM. UNIV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3709509. 
108 Griffin, supra note 106, at 209 (“the Big Three have the power to decide the fate of a substantial proportion of 
shareholder E&S proposals”).   
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selecting funds that engage in accordance with their preferences.  The second is reducing the 
level of intermediation by affording fund investors greater input into fund voting decisions. 
Market segmentation enables investors to select into a fund that meets their preferences 
as to both the desired level of engagement and the objectives of that engagement.  A recent 
article by Jonathan Zytnick offers data supportive of this approach, finding that, although today 
most mutual funds do not vote in accordance with investor preferences, the preferences of 
individual investors in ESG funds are aligned with the funds’ voting policies.109 
Market segmentation requires three elements.  First, funds must transparently disclose 
their engagement policies—meeting with management, proxy voting, sponsoring shareholder 
proposals—and the scope of issues on which they intend to engage, such as better corporate 
governance, the environment, or diversity – ideally in a way that is easy to access and 
understand.110  Second, funds must disclose sufficient information to enable investors to 
determine whether funds are behaving consistently with those policies.111  Third, and perhaps 
most importantly, investors must have meaningful choice.  For market segmentation to work, 
investors must have the option of selecting funds with whose policies they agree.112   
Significantly, this Article argues that ESG funds should vote differently from, for 
example, broad-based index funds.113  Similarly, a fund that purports to focus on environmental 
concerns should not vote in sync with a fund that prioritizes diversity. Although it may not be 
problematic for a specialty sponsor, such as Calvert, to commit all of its funds to environmental 
responsibility, the shares of products that are billed as operating passively to provide a market 
rate of return, such as index funds, should not be voted to support initiatives that could reduce 
the fund’s returns.  Importantly, fund voting behavior should not be analyzed at the sponsor 
level, an analysis that mistakenly treats the sponsor as the principal.114  Significantly, in addition 
to providing investor choice, specialization is a way of holding fund sponsors accountable, 
because investors can move their money into funds that behave in accordance with their 
values.115 
 
109 Jonathan Zytnick, Do Mutual Funds Represent Individual Investors?, N.Y.U. L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 21-
04 (Apr. 24, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3803690. 
110 See Griffith, supra note 12, at 1041 (suggesting the potential creation of stewardship funds that could market 
themselves as engaging more actively with management); but see Zytnick, supra note 109 (warning that the costs of 
acquiring granular information about different ESG funds may exceed the benefits).   
111 Market intermediaries such as Morningstar could rank funds and report on both their disclosures and their 
compliance with those disclosures.  
112 Indeed, the very act of selecting a fund in accordance with its fully-disclosed engagement policies can be 
understood as legitimizing the fund’s subsequent engagement. 
113 See also Quinn Curtis, Jill Fisch & Adriana Robertson, Do ESG Mutual Funds Deliver on Their Promises? 
MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (providing empirical evidence that funds that identify as ESG funds vote 
differently from other funds). 
114 See Fisch, Hamdani & Solomon, supra note 26 at 22, 32 (distinguishing between activities of the sponsor and 
those of the individual mutual fund).  
115 There is evidence that at least some investors do not share the ideological preferences of Larry Fink.  New funds 
are seeking to attract investors with different social and political preferences.  See, e.g., Ryan Vlastelica, This fund 
invests only in companies that contribute to Trump and Republicans. Its ticker: MAGA, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 1, 
2017, 7:52 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/think-trump-and-the-republicans-can-make-you-money-this-
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The second option involves enabling fund beneficiaries to provide input into fund voting 
decisions.  This can be accomplished directly through pass-through voting or indirectly through a 
system in which a portfolio manager retains voting authority but obtains input from the funds’ 
investors about their voting preferences.116  
Over the years, various commentators have advocated for pass-through voting by mutual 
fund investors.117 Technological innovations currently offer the promise of making pass-through 
voting easier and less expensive.118  Nonetheless, pass-through voting raises challenges.119  In 
particular, given the relatively low levels of voting by direct retail investors, there are reasons to 
question the extent to which mutual fund investors, who are likely to be less sophisticated and 
engaged in individual portfolio companies, will exercise voting rights. 120   At the extreme, the 
failure of such investors to vote might lead issuers to experience difficulties in meeting quorum 
requirements unless mutual funds adopted policies for voting the fraction of shares that would 
otherwise not be voted. In addition, as Caleb Griffin notes, pass-through voting does not offer 
investors a mechanism for consolidating their voting power.121 Social media platforms such as 
reddit might enable retail investors to overcome this problem but have not yet done so.122 
 
new-etf-bets-on-maga-2017-08-31 (describing MAGA ETF which holds companies that are seen as supportive of 
the Republican Party). 
116 There are indications that the large asset managers are taking steps to permit pass-through voting by their 
institutional customers, although their efforts have not yet extended to mutual fund shareholders. BlackRock, for 
example, announced that it would start allowing certain of its institutional clients to cast their own votes rather than 
having their shares voting by BlackRock’s investment stewardship team.  See Simon Jessop & Ross Kerber, 
BlackRock to give clients more say on holding firms to account, REUTERS, Oct. 7, 2021, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/blackrock-agm-letter/blackrock-to-give-clients-more-say-on-holding-firms-to-
account-idUSL8N2R32Y7. 
117 See, e.g., Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493, 530 (2018) 
(considering pass-through voting, but acknowledging that it would be burdensome for both funds and their 
investors); Jennifer S. Taub, Able but not Willing: The Failure of Mutual Fund Advisors to Advocate for 
Shareholders’ Rights, 34 IOWA J. CORP. L. 843, 889 (2009) (advocating “optional pass-through voting, where 
Advisers would have to take proxy assignments from retail fund shareholders who wish to vote from time to time on 
contentious matters at portfolio companies.”). 
118 See Griffith, supra note 12, at 992 (explaining that the “separation of economic returns and voting rights inherent 
in mutual fund investing likely reflects the underdeveloped infrastructure of shareholder voting”.); Sergio Alberto 
Gramitto Ricci & Christina M. Sautter, Corporate Governance Gaming: The Power of Retail Investors, 22 NEV. L. J. 
(forthcoming 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3815088 (manuscript at 33) (observing that “blockchain, distributed 
ledgers, or even virtual reality” can provide retail investors with access to voting at “very affordable costs”). 
119 I have previously expressed concern about the desirability of pass-through voting.  See Jill E. Fisch, The 
Uncertain Stewardship Potential of Index Funds, in GLOBAL SHAREHOLDER STEWARDSHIP: COMPLEXITIES, 
CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES (Dionysia Katelouzou & Dan W. Puchniak eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 
forthcoming 2021). 
120 See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 12, at 995 (noting low levels of voting by retail investors); see also Broadridge & 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2015 Proxy Season Preview 3 (1st ed. 2015), 
http://media.broadridge.com/documents/Broadridge-PwC-ProxyPulse-1st-Edition-2015.pdf (reporting that retail 
investors vote only 29% of their shares, while institutional investors vote 90%). 
121 Caleb Griffin, We Three Kings: Disintermediating Voting at the Index Fund Giants, 79 MD. L. REV. 954, 983 
(2020). 
122 See Ricci & Sautter, supra note 118 (manuscript at 33) (explaining that “online communication venues . . .  
decrease the costs of collective action”).  
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The other option is to offer fund investors the opportunity to communicate their 
preferences to fund managers.  Rather than voting their proportional interest in the portfolio 
companies directly, investors would advise fund managers as to their views, giving fund 
managers a basis for determining investors preferences that could be factored into the fund’s 
voting decision, but that need not be controlling. The advantage of a preference system is that it 
would enable the fund manager to consider the number of investors who had weighed in, the 
degree of disparity among their views, and the extent to which the manager had superior 
information with respect to a given issue.  In addition, communication would enable fund 
managers to use their expertise to formulate voting policies, an outcome that unsophisticated or 
rationally apathetic fund investors might prefer.  The disadvantage of allowing fund managers to 
retain voting power is that managers would retain the discretion to vote and, as noted above, they 
might not be motivated to weigh investor preferences appropriately. It would be difficult both to 
enable managers to retain a degree of discretion and, at the same time, hold them accountable for 
failing to adhere to the views articulated by fund investors, especially if many investors do not 
participate in the process. 
In considering these possibilities, a critic might reasonably question why, if market-based 
approaches are feasible, existing institutional intermediaries are not already offering them.  The 
answer to that is twofold.  First, it is likely that potential market developments to facilitate pass-
through voting or preference registration are in transition.  The market is still evaluating the 
potential impact of new technologies like blockchain on proxy voting.  Companies like Say are 
developing platforms to enable retail investors to communicate their views to issuers, and 
analogous approaches could be used for mutual fund investors.123 Finally, although the potential 
of social media to facilitate collective action and retail investor communication is substantial, it 
is largely untapped, and social media engagement currently raises other concerns about investor 
vulnerability and the potential for manipulation.124 
Second, the extent to which asset managers are motivated voluntarily to adopt market-
based reforms that would reduce empty voting is unclear.  It is likely that executives at some of 
the largest institutional investors personally value the attention and clout that they obtain by 
wielding the voting power of the assets they manage.  The leaders of the large public pension 
funds obtained considerable attention and influence by engaging with their portfolio companies, 
sponsoring shareholder proposals, and exercising their voting power.125  More recently, several 
mutual fund leaders, most prominently Larry Fink at BlackRock, have received widespread 
attention for focusing their fund engagement on high-profile societal and political issues.  This 
 
123 See SAY, https://www.saytechnologies.com/investor (last visited Sep. 5, 2021). 
124 Ricci & Sautter, supra note 118 (manuscript at 35) (describing “engaging with corporate governance” as “the 
next logical step for retail investors”).  
125 See generally Stephen Choi & Jill E. Fisch, On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the Developing Role of 
Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance, 61 VAND. L. REV. 315 (2008) (reporting survey evidence on 
engagement by public pension funds in corporate governance). 
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attention likely contributed to the role that Fink and BlackRock played in consulting with top 
U.S. government officials about the market’s response to the pandemic.126 
The power enjoyed by asset managers that is provided by the heft associated with the 
substantial holdings of the funds they manage may present an obstacle to market-based reform.  
It is unsurprising that mutual fund managers have not rushed to provide their beneficiaries with 
pass-through voting, as such voting would both deprive the managers of influence and prevent 
the funds from speaking with a single voice. Today many mutual fund managers are receiving 
public praise for their efforts to encourage their portfolio companies to engage in more socially 
responsible behavior, and whether or not their beneficiaries support those positions, vesting the 
power to make decisions in the hands of beneficiaries tempers the ability of the fund managers 
and sponsors to take credit. 
B. Regulatory Responses 
To the extent market responses are inadequate, the alternative is regulatory reform.  
Regulators could address the potential for empty voting by limiting the extent to which 
intermediaries can exercise voting power, by limiting the scope of issues on which intermediaries 
can vote, or by requiring intermediaries to provide mechanisms by which the economic owners 
of stock can influence the voting behavior of their agents. 
A few scholars have suggested that, in appropriate cases, intermediaries should be 
prohibited from voting their shares.  Perhaps best known is the proposal by Professor Dorothy 
Lund that “would restrict passive funds from voting their shares.”127  Professor Lund’s proposal 
is not premised on the potential that asset managers’ voting preferences will differ from those of 
their customers, but rather that asset managers, particularly those who manage passive funds, 
will rationally be uninformed and are therefore poorly positioned to influence corporate 
decisions.128 Caleb Griffin offers a more modest proposal – that the votes of institutional 
investors be capped.129  Such an approach would limit institutional power but, as Griffin 
observes, shift that power to other investors, raising the difficult question of whether such 
investors would be better positioned to exercise it.130  Professor Sean Griffith argues that 
regulation should impose a default rule prohibiting mutual funds from voting against 
management on issues where they do not possess an informational advantage.131 Professor 
Griffith explicitly argues that mutual funds should defer to management on environmental and 
 
126 See, e.g., Jeanna Smialek, Top U.S. Officials Consulted With BlackRock as Markets Melted Down, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 24, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/24/business/economy/fed-blackrock-pandemic-crisis.html 
(reporting, in response to the market meltdown “how intertwined BlackRock has become with the federal 
government”). 
127 Lund, supra note 117, at 528.  
128 Id. at 529 (“the law would make all parties better off by restricting passive funds from casting uninformed 
votes”). 
129 Griffin, supra note 121, at 983.  
130 Id. 
131 Griffith, supra note 12.  
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social issues because “[m]anagement has superior information in determining the effect of ES 
proposals on shareholder wealth.”132  
A more moderate reform would involve scaling down the existing regulations that force 
or pressure institutional investors to vote the shares of their portfolio companies.133  As noted 
above, the SEC implemented rules requiring mutual funds both to vote their shares and to 
disclose their votes and voting policies.134  Similarly, the Department of Labor determined that 
proxy voting was part of a pension fund’s fiduciary duty.135  Yet the obligation to vote on issues 
in which the relationship between value and values is unclear, or on which a fund’s beneficiaries 
may have different or even directly conflicting views, is far from clear.136  Arguably voting on 
ESG shareholder proposals should be optional for institutional investors, and a fund should be 
permitted, consistent with its fiduciary duties, to abstain from voting on the basis that it lacks 
sufficient information about the potential impact – economic or otherwise of the proposal or it 
cannot formulate a voting policy that accurately reflects the interests of its beneficiaries.137  The 
Department of Labor’s 2020 rule on fiduciary obligations under the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) with respect to proxy voting could be understood as a 
partial implementation of this approach through its requirement that fiduciaries engage in proxy 
voting solely in the economic interest of the plan and its explicit recognition that plans need not 
vote every proxy.138 Another option would require institutional investors to engage in mirror 
voting in which they voted their shares in the same proportion as direct retail investors. This 
approach would be premised on the expectation that retail investor voting preferences are a 
reasonable approximation of the views of retail investors in pension or mutual funds. 
Alternatively, the extent to which intermediaries can vote on the type of ESG issues that 
present a potential conflict of interest could be reduced by modifying the scope of the SEC’s 
shareholder proposal rule.  Most shareholder votes on ESG issues occur through the shareholder 
proposal process which is, as one commentator observes, a “regulatory creation.”139 The 
shareholder proposal rule was adopted in 1942.140 At the time, it was not inevitable that the rule 
would allow shareholder-initiated proposals on a broad range of social policy issues.  For 
 
132 Id. at 1030.   
133 Id. at 1045 (explaining that “[l]aw and regulation push mutual funds to vote”). 
134 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
135 See supra note 24. 
136 Griffith, supra note 12, at 1045. (“A fund fiduciary does not advance its investors’ interests by voting when they 
would prefer that it not.”).  
137 Such an approach raises the possibility that institutions would employ this rationale frequently to avoid the effort 
of exercising an informed vote, thereby undermining the increased management accountability that has resulted 
from the SEC and Department of Labor initiatives to encourage voting. 
138 Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy Voting and Shareholder Rights, 85 Fed. Reg. 81658 (Dec. 16, 2020). The 
impact of this rule is unclear as the Biden administration subsequently announced its intention not to enforce the 
rule.  See Lee Barney, DOL Says It Won’t Enforce Final Rules on ESG and Proxy Voting, Compliance, PLAN 
ADVISOR (Mar. 10, 2021), https://www.planadviser.com/dol-says-wont-enforce-final-rules-esg-proxy-voting/. 
139 Griffith, supra note 12, at 1027 (observing that “ES issues typically arise not as contests, but as ‘shareholder 
proposals’”).  
140 Jill E. Fisch, The Transamerica Case, in THE ICONIC CASES IN CORPORATE LAW 46, 49 (Jonathan R. Macey ed., 
2008) (recounting the history of the shareholder proposal rule).   
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example, in 1945, the SEC Division of Corporate Finance concluded that general political, 
social, and economic matters were not “proper subjects for action by security holders.”141  
The SEC’s position evolved over time, in part in response to potential legislation that 
would have overruled SEC restrictions on social policy proposals.142 In 1972, the SEC amended 
Rule 14a-8 to provide that social policy proposals could be excluded only if they were not 
“significantly related to the business of the issuer or [] not within its control.”143  Although Rule 
14a-8 allows corporations to exclude proposals that relate to a company’s ordinary business 
operations, courts and the SEC have interpreted the exclusion narrowly to allow social policy 
proposals that “transcend[] the day-to-day business matters and raises policy issues so significant 
that [they] would be appropriate for a shareholder vote…”144  
Notably, however, these developments predate the recent high level of engagement on 
social policy matters by institutional intermediaries with substantial voting power.145  As the 
SEC recently observed in adopting amendments to Rule 14a-8, changes in share ownership, 
technology, and the markets may warrant reconsideration of the type of shareholder proposals 
that should be permitted under the rule.146 
 Regulatory intervention is a serious response to empty voting.  Evaluating the extent to 
which it is warranted, and the costs associated with such intervention is beyond the scope of this 
Article. The prospect of regulation, however, may be a powerful tool in encouraging institutional 
receptiveness to market-based mechanisms that reduce the extent to which institutional 
intermediaries can use other people’s money to influence corporate decisions.  
 Conclusion 
 As shareholders exercise greater power over corporate decisions through their voting and 
engagement, and as they deploy that power over a broader range of issues, it has become 
increasingly important to understand who those shareholders are and the motivations for their 
behavior.  Professor Karmel recognized, over a decade ago, that the role of institutional investors 
presents distinctive concerns because institutions may not fairly represent the views of their 
fellow shareholders.  Intermediation raises an additional complexity in that those who act on 
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145 See Fisch, supra note 140, at 57 (describing expanded approach to permissibility of social policy proposals in the 
1970s).  
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behalf of institutions may not fairly represent the views of those whose economic interests they 
are charged with serving.   
 The evolving focus of corporate decisionmaking to encompass non-economic 
considerations adds an additional dimension to the analysis, making it both harder to treat 
shareholder interests as homogeneous and more difficult to apply guardrails to constrain 
institutional intermediaries appropriately.  In a time of increasing political and social 
polarization, the case for such guardrails is compelling. 
 This Article identifies several regulatory and market options that can reduce the potential 
agency costs associated with empty voting by mutual funds and other institutions. While market 
solutions may forestall the need for regulatory intervention, they depend critically on the 
willingness of asset managers to forego some of the influence provided by the substantial assets 
they manage. Whether they will choose to do so is, at present, uncertain.  
